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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in the matter, pursuant to 
Section 8-2a-3 (2) (f), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
(PRESERVATION OF APPEAL ON THE RECORD) 
ISSUE NO-1 
The Affidavit, and the Search Warrant it supports, fail to meet statutory 
and case law requirements for probable cause and the Court erred in denying 
Defendant's / Appellant's Motion to Quash Search Warrant and Suppress 
Evidence. Preserved for appeal at [R. 55-71, 136] 
The standard for review of a magistrate's finding of probable cause for the 
issuance of a search warrant was stated in State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 
1259-1260 (Utah 1993) (citations and footnotes omitted); 
In reviewing the magistrate's finding of 
probable cause to support a search warrant based on an 
affidavit, we will find the warrant invalid only if the 
magistrate, given the totality of the circumstances, lacked a 
"substantial basis" for determining that probable cause 
existed. . . . In conducting this review, we will consider the 
search warrant affidavit in "its entirety and in a common-
sense fashion" and give "great deference" to the magistrate's 
decision. .. . The affidavit must support the magistrate's 
decision that there is a "fair probability" that evidence of the 
crime will be found in the place or places named in the 
warrant. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a final order of Judgment and Sentence for one 
count of possession of a controlled substance, a 3 Degree Felony. This 
conviction is based upon Appellant's conditional plea of guilty, to said charge, 
to enable him to appeal the Trial Court's denial of his Motion to Quash the 
Warrant and Suppress the Evidence. 
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PRO VISIONS 
[U.S.C. 18 §] 3109, Section 8-2a-3 (2) (f), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as 
amended, section 77-23-203, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended), section 
77-23-210, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended): The Fourth Amendment 
of the U.S. Constitution. Utah Const., art, I, § 14. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On the 3r day of February, 2000, Officer R. Chris Trani, of the 
Washington County Drug Task Force, drafted a Search Warrant, and an 
Affidavit in support thereof, for a dwelling located at 462 South, 100 West, St. 
George, Utah. The Warrant also included associated out buildings and vehicles, 
along with the persons: John Winston Bangerter, and Justin Grant Bangerter. 
Said search warrant application was presented to the Honorable James L. 
Shumate, a Judge of the Fifth Judicial District Court of Washington County, 
State of Utah. Said application was approved, and a day or night, no notice, 
search was authorized. The Search Warrant was executed, on or about, the 8th 
day of February, 2000, resulting in the discovery of several items of contraband. 
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The Affidavit in support of the search warrant contains information 
allegedly from three sources, two of which are confidential, giving information 
directly to the police. These sources, allegedly, are also the conduit through 
which other sources funneled information to the police and which are included 
in the Affidavit. The confidential sources, and their relationship to the suspects, 
"were intentionally kept vague in order to protect their identities." 
The "No Notice", and "Night Time Entry", authority in the Search 
Warrant is supported only by this same affidavit. [R. 11—13] [R. 5-10] 
The Affidavit, and the Search Warrant, both issued on February 3, 
2000, at 22:16 hours, and the Search Warrant was executed on February 8, 
2000 at 0523 hours. [R. 9, 12] 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
We have, in this affidavit, if you read it quickly, what looks like, woe 
boy, there is so much grist in this thing; it's so packed with facts and 
information; this is one of the best affidavits for a search warrant I have ever 
seen. But, if you carefully look at it, take it apart, if you will, there is nothing 
there. It's a group of people, exercising the right of peaceful assembly, being 
accused of involvement in a common criminal enterprise by a string of faceless 
accusers. Guilt by association! 
All of the incriminating facts come from two confidential sources. 
Confidential Source #1 had never been in the residence and had been told by two 
other sources that drug activity was going on in that residence. These second 
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tier sources were known only to Confidential Source #1, and not to the police, 
who could not verify their existence; let alone, their veracity. [R. 6-7] 
Confidential Source # 2 told a Detective Randall about a suspected 
methamphetamine lab in the trunk of a car owned by Delanie Drake. Delanie 
Drake's car was seen at the Bangerter residence on Feb 2, 2000 between 11:30 
P.M. and 2:00 A.M. However, that was not the car which, according to 
Confidential Source #2, was equipped with a drug lab. Confidential Source #2 
was quoted in the affidavit in such a way that does not inform the reader that any 
of the information is from first hand knowledge. [R. 7] 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT FAILS TO CITE 
SUFFICIENT FACTS TO ESTABLISH THE RELIABILITY 
OF THE INFORMANTS, OR THEIR INFORMATION. 
Two copies of the Affidavit in Support of Search Warrant appear in the 
record; one as [R.5-10], and the second as [R.68-71]. For purposes of clarity, 
the second copy, [R. 68-71], will be used, as its paragraphs have been numbered 
(1 through 11) by this author, for reference purposes. Said affidavit contains 
two (2) sections (numbered 5 & 6) pertaining to probable cause for the issuance 
of the Search Warrant. 
Quoting State ofUtahv Singleton, 854p.2d 1017, 214 Utah Adv. Rep. 30 
(App 1993): 
The test for the sufficiency of an affidavit supporting a 
search warrant, under the Fourth Amendment, is set forth in 
Illinois V. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S. Ct. 2317(1983)... 
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I*fii5 See Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S. 
Ct. 584 (1969); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S. Ct 
1509 (1964). The two-pronged test required the affidavit to 
set forth sufficient underlying circumstances to establish both 
(1) the basis of knowledge of the informant, and (2) the 
informant's veracity and reliability. See Gates, 462 U.S. at 
228-29, 103 S. Ct. At 2327.1 
Utah has applied the totality-of-the-circumstances 
analysis when determining whether an affidavit sets forth 
facts sufficient to establish probable cause under the Fourth 
Amendment. See, e.g., Thurman, 203 Utah Adv. Rep. At 19-
20; State v Hansen, 732P.2d 127, 130-3 1 (Utah 1987); 
White, 210 Utah Adv. Rep. At 60-61. 
Utah courts, however, have used the Aguilar-Spinelli 
factors as guides in applying the totality-of-the-circumstances 
test. "An informant's 'reliability' and 'basis of knowledge' 
are but two relevant considerations, among others, in 
determining the existence of probable cause under 'a totality -
of-the circumstances. " Hansen, 732 P.2d at 130 (citing 
Gates, 462 U.S. at 23 1-32, 235-36, 103 S. Ct. At 2328-3 1). 
See also State v. Purser, 828 P. 2d. 515, 517 (Utah App. 
1992). 
The Aguilar-Spinelli guidelines are not applied as 
"strict, independent requirements to be 'rigidly exacted' in 
every case. A weakness, in one or the other, is not fatal to the 
warrant so long as, in totality, there is substantial basis to find 
probable cause. " Hansen, 732 P.2d at 130 (citing Gates, 462 
U.S. at 238, 103 S. Ct. At 2332). Thus, the signiticance of 
each factor involved in finding of probable cause differs on a 
base-by-case basis. See id; Purser, 828 P2d. At 517. 
The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to 
make a practical, commonsense decision whether, 
f iven all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit efore him, including the "veracity" and "basis of 
knowledge" of persons supplying hearsay information, 
there is a fair probability that contraband, or evidence 
of a crime, will be found in a particular place. The 
duty of reviewing court is simply to ensure that the 
magistrate had a "substantial basis for.... concluding" 
that probable cause existed. Gates (quoting Jones v. 
United States, 362 U.S. 257, 271, 80 S. Ct. 725, 736 
(I960)). 
The following is a paragraph by paragraph analysis of Sections 5 8c 6 (all 
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of the probable cause information contained in the affidavit in Support of Search 
Warrant in this case) using the number designation placed on each paragraph by 
this author. 
Paragraph 1: The confidential source told the information to the officer on 
February 3, 2000, but the affidavit does not state when the source(s) of the 
confidential source saw the activities, or learned the information: 
Therefore, that paragraph presents the following three (3) problems: 
There is nothing in the affidavit regarding the reliability of the C. S's 
source(s), (2) the information is double hearsay, and (3) the reader has no way of 
knowing when the C. S.' s source saw the activities, or learned the information; 
it could have been months, or years, before. Therefore, there is no way to 
determine whether staleness is a factor in the information given, thereby 
precluding it from being reliable it terms of probable cause. 
Paragraph 2: This paragraph presents the same three (3) problems as 
paragraph " 1 " . 
Paragraph 3: The affidavit never states that C.S #1 was ever in the 
Bangerter residence, nor does it state how the source of C.S. #1 learned the 
information. The information in paragraph "3" is problematic; the reader cannot 
discern the basis for C. S. #l ' s conclusions; i.e., how C. S. #1 acquired the 
knowledge about Cornwell, the cooking and lab equipment, or how old the 
information is. There is nothing in the Affidavit to indicate that CS #1 had ever 
visited the Bangerter residence; thus, the reliability factor is again questionable 
when considering CS #1 's "extensive" knowledge of the activities, at that 
residence, referred to therein. Further, it probably constitutes hearsay on 
hearsay. Much of the other "information" in the Affidavit (that dealing with 
"others' knowledge" of the Defendant), is also third party related, or related to 
other parties, at other locations, at other unstated times; rarely, if at all, tied to 
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the residence for which the warrant is sought. Finally, one can wonder if the 
officer was ever certain who resided at that address, as one of the classifications 
of items to be searched for in his "C-2" attachment, titled, ITEMS TO BE 
SEIZED, paragraph 4, is described as follows: 
Residency papers; to include: utility receipts and 
or bills, rental agreements / lease, articles showing 
occupancy of the premises or ownership of the 
premises or automobiles. 
The Affidavit, with "C-2" attachment, never states that the residence is 
the home of, place of occupation of, or a place frequented by, the Defendant. 
Excepting for the mention of methamphetamine, the warrant does not provide 
the required specificity, or particularity, of a lawful warrant, but merely amounts 
to a potpourri of a laundry list of items for which to search, and places in which 
to search for them; in essence, a "general warrant". 
Paragraph 4: This paragraph refers to an automobile not sought to be 
searched. Further, it states that the items were no longer in the car; that they had 
been discarded in the trash. This Affidavit also fails to state when the events 
occurred and none of the information in this paragraph ties to the Bangerter 
residence (lack of nexus). This paragraph, therefore, should have resulted in a 
warrant to search the County Dump, the ultimate destination indicated, for the 
items sought, by the information revealed in paragraph "4". 
But, to return to the trunk of the car, and the discarded items thereof, and 
the officer's second hand description of them; the haphazard description of 
them, by Delanie's father, does little to justify the warrant, constitutionally. 
The Fourth Amendment states that "no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing.. .the.. .things to be seized." (Compare Utah Const., art, I, § 14 
identical in substance and effect). The Fourth Amendment is not satisfied by 
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recitals which describe general categories of "things" which, though they may 
be made the proper subject of a search warrant, fail to command law 
enforcement to search for and seize items which are described with as much 
particularity as circumstances permit. See generally 2 W. LaFave, Search and 
Seizure § 4.6(d)(3d ed., 1996). 
In this search warrant, in this case, only one item, to wit: 
methamphetamine, is described with particularity. 
As an example, a mere reference to "the weapon used in the armed 
robbery" is to argue as "weapon is a generic term that could apply to a variety of 
instruments," and the robbery victim could surely be more specific as to the kind 
of weapon used. People vHolmes, 312N.E.2d 748 (111. App. 1974). See also, 
State v. Pennington, 642 S. W.2d 646 (Mo. 1982) (warrant for "weapon" too 
vague). Similarly, a description of "burglary tools" is insufficient, for they "are 
simply hand tools designed for lawful use until the intent to use or possess them 
unlawfully appears, and one man's tools resembles another's." In re 1969 
PlymouthRoadrunner, 455 S.W.2d 466 (Mo. 1970). See also, 2 LaFave, at 568, 
m. 84 (citing numerous authorities). 
To underscore the point that the items described by Delanie's father were 
truly generic, in paragraph 6, the officer explains the following: 
"He explained to us that the vehicle with the items in the trunk belonged 
to him." 
The officer, by including a long list of categories of things to be seized, 
has invalidated the search warrant. 
Paragraph 5: This paragraph ties in with paragraph "3", which is replete 
with problems for the State. Further, this paragraph "5 " only has relevance if 
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the information in paragraph "3" (which, as pointed out, is suspect) is taken into 
consideration. Paragraph 5 is devoid of probable cause information. 
Paragraph 6: The information in this paragraph is subject to the same 
defects, and lacking the same relevance, and nexus, as discussed above 
regarding paragraph "4" of the affidavit. 
Paragraph 7: This paragraph does not state when the surveillance and 
observation occurred. It does not state that Delanie, and Kenyon, were in the 
vehicle when the officer saw it. Nor does the affidavit indicate that the vehicle 
contained contraband when the officers saw it. It contains no relevant probable 
cause. 
Paragraph 8: The information in this paragraph, relating to Mr. Cornwell, 
is lacking in nexus to the Bangerter residence. Paragraph "3" of the affidavit 
contains the only tie-in to said residence and paragraph "3" is lacking in 
timeliness, and contains all the other problems discussed above. Said paragraph 
"8" fails to state what Staheli's involvement was in the other investigation and, 
in fact, states that he was merely "on the periphery" of that investigation. The 
allegation that Johnny and Grant Bangerter "have been investigated for, or 
suspected to be involved in, the manufacture of methamphetamine in the past" 
adds nothing to probable cause to search the premises at the address listed in the 
Affidavit. The balance of said paragraph 8 contains no probable cause for the 
issuance of the Search Warrant. 
Paragraph 9: This paragraph attempts to tie a "Mr. Bangerter" (first name 
not stated) to drug activities by linking "Mr. Bangerter" to Shirl Shane Johnson, 
who, in November of 1999, had several cases of book matches in his truck. That 
paragraph also states the Mr. Johnson was stopped when leaving "Mr. 
Bangerter's" residence on November 29, 1999. Said information was over two 
(2) months old; therefore, stale. Apparently, no criminal charges were filed as a 
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result of the said November stop of Mr. Johnson, and there is no indication that 
Johnson had been in the Bangerter residence. Also, if one refers to the section 
in the affidavit entitled, "LOCATION OF SEARCH", the reader will discover 
that the affidavit does not state the names of any persons who resided at 462 
South 100 West, St. George, Utah. The affidavit may contain implications that 
Johnny Winston Bangerter and Grant Justin Bangerter reside at that address, but 
it does not so state. The affidavit contains nothing to indicate that the officer did 
anything to determine who lived at said address, or to verify who occupied the 
premises thereon. As a result, said paragraph "9" is lacking in nexus between 
the information stated and the address given. In addition, said paragraph 9 is not 
productive of probable cause to search the residence. 
Paragraph 10: This paragraph is conclusory, only, and is not productive of 
probable cause to search the residence. 
Paragraph 11: The first two sentences of this paragraph are conclusory, 
only. The remainder of the paragraph is an attempt to establish the reliability of 
the two (2) sources that provided information to the officers. However, those 
sources obtained their information from other sources. As a result, most of the 
information in the affidavit is hearsay on hearsay, and nothing is stated in the 
affidavit about the reliability of the persons who provided the information to 
C.S. #1 andC.S.#2. 
As a result, the affidavit must fail due to failure to contain reliable 
information to cause one to believe that the contraband sought to be seized 
would be found at the address given on February 3, 2000. 
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POINT II 
THE INFORMATION IN THE AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT 
IS STALE AND, AS A RESULT, DOES NOT JUSTIFY THE ISSUANCE 
OF A SEARCH WARRANT. 
See State v Vigh, 871 P.2d 1030, 1033 (Utah App. 1994) (including stale 
info in affidavit is improper but not fatal; court will excise stale info and then 
determine if remaining information still demonstrates probable cause). 
No dates are given of the occurrences recited in the Affidavit in Support of 
Search Warrant that would support probable cause for the issuance of a search 
warrant. In the two (2) PROBABLE CAUSE sections of said affidavit, only 
four (4) dates are given. Paragraph 1: Feb. 3, 2000, equals the date C.S. #1 told 
the officers what others had told him / her. January 29, 2000, equals the date 
that the person, the one informing the informant, said that the incident occurred. 
Paragraph 6: Feb. 2, 2000, equals the date that Mr. Drake told the officers 
what vehicle Kenyon and Delanie were driving that night. The information in 
that paragraph does not relate to the residence sought to be searched. 
Paragraph 9: November 29, 1999, equals the night that the Task Force 
stopped Mr. Jonson's truck, with a "Mr. Bangerter" in it, and found cases of 
book matches. The facts relating to the first two (2) dates are not probative of 
probable cause to search, because we don't know when the informant claimed 
the events occurred. We don't know whether that information is fresh, or old. 
Therefore, said information should not be considered in determining whether, or 
not, sufficient probable cause is produced by the Affidavit. 
The remaining two dates do not tie to 462 South 100 West, St. George, 
Utah. 
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Once this court excises the unreliable information from the Affidavit (that 
is hearsay on hearsay, with nothing stated to support the reliability of the 
original source, and the information that must be deemed stale, because the 
reader cannot determine when the events occurred) there is little, or nothing, left 
in the Affidavit to support probable cause to search. 
Also, absent such unreliable, and /or stale, information, there is 
insufficient information in the affidavit to support a nexus between the 
remaining facts and the officer's belief that controlled substances, laboratory 
equipment, drug precursors, paraphernalia, records of drug possession, purchase, 
or drug manufacturing, instructions would be found on the premises described as 
462 South 100 West, St. George, Utah. 
For these reasons the evidence seized from those premises should be 
suppressed. 
POINT III 
THE MAGISTRATE DID NOT MAKE THE PREDICATE 
FINDINGS WHEN ISSUING THIS SEARCH WARRANT. 
Section 77-23-203, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended) states: 
Conditions precedent to issuance. 
(1) A search warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause supported 
by oath, or affirmation, particularly describing the person, or place, to be 
searched, and the person, property, or evidence to be seized. 
(2) If the item sought to be seized is evidence of illegal conduct, and is in 
the possession of a person, or entity, for which there is insufficient 
probable cause, shown to the magistrate, to believe that such person, or 
entity, is a party to the alleged illegal conduct, no search warrant shall 
issue except upon a finding, by the magistrate, that the evidence sought to 
be seized cannot be obtained by subpoena, or that such evidence would be 
concealed, destroyed, damaged, or altered if sought by subpoena. If such 
a finding is made, and a search warrant issued, the magistrate shall direct, 
upon the warrant, such conditions that reasonably afford protection of the 
following interests of the person, or entity, in possession of such evidence: 
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(a) protection against unreasonable interference with normal 
business; 
(b) protection against the loss, or disclosure, of protected 
confidential sources of information; or 
(c) protection against prior, or direct, restraints on constitutionally 
protected rights, (emphasis added) 
Subsection 2 of said Code requires the magistrate to make a finding that 
the evidence would be concealed, destroyed, damaged, or altered, if sought by 
subpoena. No such finding was made. Also, the Affidavit in this case, as 
demonstrated above, fails to tie to the address given in the affidavit. 
Subsection 2 also requires the magistrate to make findings if the evidence 
cannot be obtained by subpoena. No such findings were made in the search 
warrant. With the magistrate having failed to make the code required findings 
per said code, section 77-23-203, the Search Warrant must fail, and the evidence 
obtained, thereby, should be suppressed. 
In addition, the officers apparently waited five days, after the Search 
Warrant issued, before they executed same, which shows that no emergency 
existed. 
For those reasons alone, the Search Warrant must fail and the evidence 
should be suppressed. 
POINT IV 
THE "NO NOTICE", AND "NIGHT TIME ENTRY", AUTHORITY, 
IN THE SEARCH WARRANT, IS NOT SUPPORTED BY 
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS IN THE AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT 
OF THE SEARCH WARRANT. 
The only statement in the Affidavit, given by the Affiant, in support of the 
authorization to enter the "residence", without giving notice, is as follows; "I 
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request that this warrant be executable, day or night, and without notice, due to 
the fact that an approach and entry, at nighttime, is safer for officers, suspects, 
and bystanders, due to the element of surprise, and the suspected controlled 
substance could easily be destroyed, altered, concealed, or removed from the 
residence; also, the hazards of unknown chemicals may be used as an act of 
deadly force by a suspect, if thrown, or mixed together, when officers are 
detected. The cover of darkness may also aid in providing for officers' safety by 
delaying the occupants of the above address from also detecting the approach of 
the officers, prior to entry, and providing "cover", should the occupant choose to 
employ violent measures to protect their laboratory, and / or their controlled 
substance". That language is conclusory, only, and does not justify entry into 
the residence without notice. 
In the ADDITIONAL PROBABLE CAUSE section of said Affidavit, the 
officer did state the following: 
Also, John Bangerter has a history of violence, 
threatening and resisting law enforcement; he is also the 
leader of a Skin Head group, know as the "Army of Israel", 
which is also a Christian Identity group. He has strong anti-
government beliefs and has stated, in the past, that he will 
take the lives of government officials, police included, if he 
feels they are infringing on his constitutional rights, 
especially the right to keep and bear arms. He stated to Det. 
Famsworth, in the past, that he was a fugitive from justice, 
because he was facing a felony charge, and would lose his 
right to bear arms, which was unacceptable to him. (Mr. 
Bangerter is not a fugitive at this time, although he is on 
supervised probation with Adult Probation and Parole.) He 
has also been know to fortify his dwelling, so as to prevent 
the police from entering his residence with a search warrant. 
However, there is nothing in the Affidavit that indicates that Johnny 
Bangerter resided at, or was a regular occupant of, the premises at 462 South 
100 West, St. George, Utah. 
Unlike the Rosenbaum case, 845 P. 2d 962, (Utah App. 1993), the instant 
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Affidavit does not mention that firearms had been observed at the residence, that 
the target had been seen possessing firearms, that the Affiant's training, and 
experience, led him to believe that drug traffickers frequently possess firearms 
and refuse to open their doors for persons unknown to them, or any of the other 
things listed in the Rosenbaum opinion, supra, which led Judges Greenwood, 
Gaff, and Jackson to conclude that sufficient probable cause was stated in that 
Affidavit to support the no notice authorization in the Rosenbaum search 
warrant. 
U.S. v. George Anthony Stewart, 867 F. 2d 581 (10th Cir. Ct. App. 1989) 
is a case that bears on this issue. At page 4 of that opinion, the Court stated: 
The requirement of prior notice of authority, and 
purpose, before forcing entry into a home, is deeply 
rooted in our heritage and should not be given 
grudging application. Congress, codifying a tradition 
embedded in Anglo-American law, has declared in 
[U.S.C. 18 §] 3109 the reverence of law for the 
individual's right of privacy in his house. 
Likewise, the Utah Legislature has codified that deeply rooted principle in 
section 77-23-210, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended): 
Force used in executing warrant when notice of 
authority is required as a prerequisite. 
When a search warrant has been issued 
authorizing entry into any building, room, conveyance, 
compartment, or other enclosure, the officer executing 
the warrant may use such force as is reasonably 
necessary to enter: 
(1) if, after notice of his authority and purpose, there is 
no response or he is not admitted with reasonable 
promptness; or 
(2) without notice of his authority and purpose, if the 
magistrate issuing the warrant directs in the warrant 
that the officer need not give notice. The magistrate 
shall so direct only upon proof under oath, that the 
object of the search may be quickly destroyed, 
disposed of or secreted, or that physical harm may 
result to any person, if notice were given, (emphasis 
added) 
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Apparently, no such proof was submitted to the issuing magistrate. 
With the Affidavit failing in those respects, the search warrant must fail as 
being unconstitutional. 
POINT V 
THE PURPORTED WARRANT IN THIS CASE WAS NOT A LAWFUL 
WARRANT, BUT NOTHING MORE THAN A CONSTITUTIONALLY 
PROHIBITED "GENERAL WARRANT". 
In United States of America v. Foster, 100 F.3d 846 (10th Cir. 1996), the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, dealt with a search warrant 
which authorized a search of Foster's residence for the presence of marijuana, a 
Remington 12-gauge shotgun bearing a certain serial number, a Taurus 85 38 
special pistol with a certain serial number, a 22-caliber Ruger carbine with a 
specified serial number, and a 22-caliber carbine with a green folding stock with 
a certain serial number. 
The officers arrived at the home and began to execute the search warrant. 
They located marijuana in the bedroom, and found firearms, ammunition, and 
drug paraphernalia throughout the residence and the barn. 
Over a period of several hours, the officers also located other "evidence", 
including a number of video tapes showing Mr. Foster involved in sexual acts 
with his stepdaughter, showing his use of marijuana, including one scene 
involving three or four young females smoking marijuana on the couch in his 
living room. All of the "evidence" was seized, including that which was not 
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listed in the search warrant. The search of Foster's residence lasted from 3:25 
o'clock p.m., until approximately 11:00 o'clock p.m. Although the warrant 
specifically identified the items they were to be seized, when the officers left, 
they took 35 items with them, "including various firearms, ammunition, video 
tapes, marijuana, drug paraphernalia, and other miscellaneous items". The 
officers also seized anything of value in the house. 
Foster was charged in a 12-count superseding indictment with various 
violations of United States Law. He moved to suppress all property seized 
during the search because the search "substantially exceeded the scope of the 
warrant and there were flagrant disregard for the terms of the warrant as to the 
property to be seized". Paragraph on motion, the District Court suppressed the 
evidence, including those items specifically listed in the warrant. Under the law 
in the Tenth Circuit, even evidence which is properly seized pursuant to a 
warrant must be suppressed if the officers executing the warrant exhibit flagrant 
disregard for its terms. 
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the basis for blanket 
suppression when a search warrant is executed with flagrant disregard for its 
terms is found in our traditional repugnance to "general searches" which were 
conducted in the colonies pursuant to writs of assistance. 
The Tenth Court of Appeals quoted the United States Supreme Court in 
the case of Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927), and stated: 
"The requirement that warrants shall particularly describe the things to be 
seized makes general searches under them impossible and prevents the seizure 
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of one thing under a warrant describing another. As to what is to be taken, 
nothing is left to the discretion of the officer executing the warrant." 
The Tenth Court of Appeals went on to state: 
"Therefore, Medlinll establishes that "[w]hen law enforcement 
officer grossly exceed the scope of a search warrant in seizing 
property, the particularity requirement is undermined and a valid 
warrant is transformed into a general warrant thereby requiring 
suppression of all evidence seized under that warrant." 
Finally, on its face, the search warrant issued in this case is a 
constitutionally prohibited general warrant because of its failure to define, 
specifically, the purported evidence to be seized, and its consequent 
authorization of a general search, due to its absence of required particularity. 
One may assume that the instrumentalities of a crime will likely be found 
at, or near, the location where the offense was committed, or in the perpetrator's 
possession. Indeed, it has been noted "[a] description of instrumentalities or 
evidence in general terms raises the possibility that there does not exist a 
showing of probable cause to justify a search for them." 2 LaFave, at 575. On 
the other hand, at one time it was held that a warrant could not be issued for the 
seizure of "mere evidence". See generally, 1 LaFave § 2.6(d). This is no longer 
a rule of law, but remains an expression of the fact that if "mere evidence" 
cannot be described with particularity, the assumption of its existence seldom 
constitutes probable cause. As Professor LaFave has noted "Quite obviously, a 
distinction must be drawn between instrumentalities and evidence where the 
description is limited to the type of criminal conduct involved; while, as noted 
above, this may sometimes be sufficient as to instrumentalities, it of course is 
not sufficient as to evidence." 2 LaFave, at 568. 
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The description of things in a warrant limits the permissible intensity and 
duration of the search. Once the items, which are particularly described, have 
been located and seized, the officers executing the warrant must terminate their 
intrusion. See generally, 2 LaFave § 4.10(d). They cannot extend their 
authority by drafting a warrant which fails to describe, with particularity, the 
evidence of which they are aware; substituting, therefore, the statutorily defined 
categories of seizable instrumentalities and evidence. 
In his Affidavit, in the instant case, the officer disqualified the ensuing 
warrant, as a lawful document, by including the laundry list of elements found in 
the attachment, "C-2". The inclusion of "C-2" essentially altered the warrant, 
that the affidavit sought to support, destroying the particularity required, in 
terms of probable cause, along with the constitutionality of the warrant. 
Therefore, all evidence resulting therefrom should be suppressed. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, it is respectfully submitted that the Search 
Warrant, herein, should be quashed as being violative of both the United States 
and Utah Constitutions, and the Court should suppress the evidence seized from 
the premises described in said Affidavit. 
The officer's information regarding various equipment found in the trunk 
of the vehicle is of a third party nature. Ironically, this information should have 
precluded the search warrant for the residence and made the County Dump the 
subject of the search. 
The officer offered no accounts of drug transactions at the residence; only 
third hand accounts of individuals coming and going there, who, he was told, 
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were known to be part of the drug culture, and that is hardly sufficient for the 
issuance of a search warrant to search someone's home. 
Was Delanie's father, who reported finding the materials in the trunk, and 
who likely frequented the company of his daughter, who was known to be into 
drugs, also one of these who could be considered guilty by association? If so, 
how is CS#1 's source's veracity to be assessed, in that CS#Ts source was 
purportedly "close" to the Bangerters, and had visited them at the subject 
residence to loan them "property"? 
One must ask, what are the motivations of CS#1, CS#2, and their 
"sources"? Is their information born out of self interest? Though we are assured 
by the officer, in his Affidavit, that neither received financial remuneration, in 
exchange for their information, have they received other valuable consideration, 
relating to their own legal travails? There may be no end to guilt by association. 
Have the informants, by offering their information, ameliorated their own 
criminal histories, or their outcomes, thanks to an extorting, or deal wheeling 
officer? 
Without asking these questions, without requiring their answers, prior to 
the issuance of a warrant, why should we bother with the false formality of an 
affidavit, or a warrant, at all? Why should authorities require any kind of 
"sources", or "information", prior to search? Why should the Fourth 
Amendment stand before any action is taken, based solely upon an officer's 
hunch, his contrived, or unverifiable, hearsay, or maybe even his dream? 
The warrant issuing magistrate listed no findings, as acknowledged by the 
judge presiding over the hearing. Therefore the Affidavit produced no material 
in support of the necessary findings requii. a for a lawful search warrant. 
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Consequently, any evidence seized, any statements, or admissions against 
interest, and any sentence resulting therefrom, should be considered invalid. 
Defendant, therefore, respectfully prays this Court finds that the evidence should 
be suppressed, along with all elements related thereto, as fruits of the infamous 
poisonous tree. 
Dated this 10th day of December, 2001. 
Jim R. Searth 
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, ) AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF 
Plaintiff ) SEARCH WARRANT 
vs. ) 
In the Matter of Criminal Investigation ) 
Criminal No. 
) 
.STATE OF UTAH ) 
ss. ) 
COUNTY OF WASHINGTON ) 
The undersigned Affiant, Detective Chris Trani, appearing personally before me and 
having been sworn, states on oath: 
1. OFFICER IDENTIFICATION. That I am employed by the St. George 
Police Department as a Peace Officer, and have been so employed since January of 1993. I have 
been a narcotics detective since November of 1995 and I am currently assigned to the Washington 
County Drug Task Force. I have attended two eighty (80) hour Drug Academy courses 
sponsored by the Utah Police Academy, another forty (40) hour Drug Academy class sponsored 
by the D.E.A., a forty (40) hour Clandestine Laboratory Certification Course sponsored by the 
Utah Department of Public Safety, a forty (40) hour Clandestine Laboratory Certification Course 
sponsored by the D.E.A., and within that past four years, over one hundred (100) hours of drug 
related training by the Utah Narcotics Officers Association. I have also successfully completed an 
eighty (80) hour Drug Recognition Expert course sponsored by the Utah Highway Patrol and the 
National Highway Transponation Association. I have also had numerous (over 50) hours of drug 
related training from the Utah Gang Investigators Association, the California Gang Investigators 
Association and the Nevada Gang Investigators Association. I also completed another 28 hours 
of training related to Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs and their drug involvement. I have also been 
involved in numerous drug related investigations to include, under cover buy operations, 
clandestine manufacture of methamphetamine, street level dealing operations, marijuana grow 
operations, street level drug arrests, etc. along with numerous interview and interrogation courses 
and hundreds of hours of training related to police work in general. 
I am a certified narcotics investigator for the state of Utah and I am certified by both the 
state of Utah and the D.E'. A. as a clandestine laboratory investigator. 
2. EVTDENCE/ITEMS TO BE SEIZED. The items for which a search warrant 
are sought are described as follows: Methamphetamine, a controlled substance and it's related 
paraphernalia, laboratory equipment, and any precursors used for the manufacture of a controlled 
raw'] 
substance. Also any records indicating possession or purchase of controlled substances, 
laboratory equipment, products, components, precursors, or instructions commonly associated 
with the manufacture or distribution of a controlled substance, as well as items listed on 
attachment 
"C-2". 
3. LOCATION OF SEARCH. I have probable cause to believe these items are 
on the premises described as: 462 South 100 West in St. George, Utah. This is a single family 
brick dwelling. The front door of the residence faces East, there is also a second door visible 
from the street and it faces South. There is a driveway on both the North and South sides of the 
residence. The numbers "462" are painted on the curb in front of the residence, the same numbers 
are also on a mail box which is in front of the residence to the left of the door that faces East. 
The search shall also include all related storage areas, outbuildings, locked and unlocked 
containers, curtilage, vehicles associated with the occupants of the residence, as well as those 
persons present during the execution of the search warrant. Also the "abandoned" vehicles that 
are in the back yard of the residence. 
Also the persons of Johnny Winston Bangerter (D.O.B. 06-23-69), he is a white male, 
about 6 f0r tall and weighing around 200 pounds. The person of Grant Justin Bangerter (D.O.B. 
04-26-73) he is about 5'07" tall and weighs around 195 pounds he is also a white male. 
4. GROUNDS. I have probable cause to believe these items were unlawfully 
obtained and/or possessed, and are evidence of the crimes of: Possession of Methamphetamine, a 
controlled substance, Manufacture of a Controlled Substance and Possession of Drug 
Paraphernalia. 
5. PROBABLE CAUSE. The Washington County Drug Task Force has been 
receiving information on the Bangerter residence from several different sources over the past 
week. On Feb. 3, 2000 the Task Force received information from Confidential Source (CS, to be 
referred to as CS#1 from here on out.) who told us that they have been told by two sources about 
drug activity going on in the above mentioned residence. The CS told us that they were told by a. 
person very close to them that the person went into the Bangerter residence to lend them some 
property. When this person came back to the CS, they told the CS that they were all (meaning 
the Bangerters and the people with them in the residence) smoking "glass" in the residence and 
that there was a lot of gla^s at the residence. (Glass is a common street name for a more refined 
smokeable form of crystal methamphetamine.) The person also told the CS that there was 
another man in visiting the Bangerter residence by the name of Kyle Cornwell. The above 
mentioned incident took place on Saturday January 29, 2000. 
The second source that CS#1 got their information from is a person who is very close to 
the Bangerter family. This person told CS#1 that they had been in the above mentioned residence 
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when a methamphetamine cook took place in the kitchen area. The second source told CS#1 that 
they became scared and left the residence. The second source told CS#1 that there was also a lot 
of paraphernalia all over the inside of the residence. 
CS#1 told us that when Kyle Cornwell is at the residence, there is a methamphetamine 
cook taking place. CS#1 was asked if Mr. Cornwell brought the lab equipment to the residence. 
We were told that he did not bring the equipment, nor did he leave with it. 
Det. Randall also received information from a completely unrelated source whom will be 
referred to as CS#2 from here on out. CS#2 told Det. Randall was told that there was a 
suspected methamphetamine lab concealed in the trunk of a car that was being driven by Delanie 
Drake and Kenyon Staheli. Det. Randall asked CS#2 to describe the items in the trunk of the car 
and why the CS#2 thought they were a methamphetamine lab. CS#2 told Det. Randall that they 
had been "reading" up on drugs and drug labs because they know Delanie and they knew she was 
involved in drugs. CS#2 then went on to tell Det. Randall what was in the trunk of the car. CS#2 
said there was some tubing, red phosphorus, muriatic acid, a coffee decanter with stains in it, 
several containers of unknown liquids and what appeared to be flasks along with other items that 
were wrapped in plastic grocery bags which were then wrapped in masking tape. There was also 
an item of clothing with a strong odor on which was described as a urine odor. Det. Randall was 
told that Delanie's father removed.the items from the vehicle and discarded them in the trash. 
(This took place after Kenyon Staheli was arrested while driving the vehicle the items were in.) 
Further CS#2 told Det. Randall that Delanie frequents the Bangerter residence. They also 
told Det. Randall that Delanie hangs around a man by the name of Kyle Cornwell who is also at 
the Bangerter residence a lot. They said Mr. Cornwell drives a yellow motorcycle (bullet bike 
style). 
Det. Randall and I spoke with Delanie's father. He explained to us that the vehicle with 
the items in the trunk belonged to him. The vehicle was released to Mr. Drake, who then 
proceeded to clean it out. He told us that he did remove several items from the trunk. We asked 
him to try to remember what the items were. He told us there was a coffee pot, some tubing, a 
jug of an unknown liquid which he said may be iodine, only after I started to name of chemicals to 
see if he could remember. We asked if there was any other glass ware or items he could 
remember. He said no. We asked where the items were. He told me that he threw them into his 
garbage and it was picked up by the refuse people. Mr. Drake offered to let us search the vehicle 
again. We looked into the trunk and did not locate any contraband. Det. Randall did detect the 
odor and sensations in her mouth that she associates with a methamphetamine lab. Mr. Drake 
told us he would help in any way, then told us what vehicle Kenyon and Delanie were driving that 
night, which was Feb. 2, 2000. 
We later located the vehicle Delanie and Kenyon were driving at the above mentioned 
Bangerter residence. We noticed it at about 11:30PM and it did not leave until after 2:00AM. 
We also saw a vehicle make a stop at the Bangerter residence while we were conducting 
surveillance. The vehicle was stopped on a traffic violation. The front seat passenger was Eric 
Fjermestad, who is known by us to be involved in the local drug culture. 
RTC 
6. ADDITIONAL PROBABLE CAUSE. Based on my training and experience, 
the items described to us by CS#1, CS#2 and Mr. Drake are consistent with the clandestine 
manufacture of methamphetamine. Further Mr. Cornwell has been the subject of more than one 
investigation in the past where he was known to be manufacturing methamphetamine in both Utah 
and Las Vegas, NV. Mr. Cornwell in a well known in the local drug culture as a 
methamphetamine cook. Mr. Kenyon Staheli was also on the periphery of an investigation the 
Task Force was conducting where we suspected a methamphetamine manufacture operation was 
taking place. Also Both Johnny and Grant Bangerter have been investigated for or suspected to 
be involved in the manufacture of methamphetamine in the past. Also John Bangerter has a 
history of violence, threatening and resisting law enforcement, he is also the leader of a Skin Head 
group known as the "Army of Israel" which is also a Christian Identity group. He has strong ami 
government beliefs and has stated in the past that will take the lives of government officials, police 
included, if he feels they are infringing on his constitutional rights, especially the right to keep and 
bear arms. He stated to Det. Farnsworth (in the past) that he was a fugitive from justice because 
he was facing a felony charge and would lose his right to bear arms which was unacceptable to 
him. (Mr. Bangerter is not a fugitive at this time although, he is on supervised probation with 
Adult Probation and Parole.) He has also been known to fortify his dwellings so as to prevent the 
police from entering his residence with a search warrant. 
On November 29, 1999 members of the Task Force stopped a subject by the name of Shirl 
Shane Johnson leaving Mr. Bangerter's residence, Mr. Bangerter was with him when he was 
stopped. The Task Force had previously been investigating Mr. Johnson for suspected drug 
activity in the LaVerkin area. When Mr. Johnson was stopped, he had several cases of book 
matches in the bed of his truck. When we asked what he was doing with the matches, he replied 
"They are not for what you think." When I asked him what he thought we would think about 
them, he stammered and replied "They are not stolen property." I called the motel in Hurricane 
where the matches were from. The owner told me that they were old matches. I told the owner 
that Mr. Johnson said he got them from a female with the last name of Gubler. I also explained to 
the owner that the match books could be used in the manufacture of methamphetamine. The 
owner then told me that they suspected that Ms. Gubler was involved in drugs. 
Also in my training and experience, controlled substances and their related paraphernalia 
are often kept on someone's person. I have also found that it is sometimes outbuildings and 
vehicles. Failure to search the curtilage, storage areas, locked and unlocked containers, vehicles 
associated with the occupants of the residence, together with the people present during the 
execution of the search warrant, will likely result in officers missing important evidence. 
CS#1 has proven their self to be reliable to the Task Force in the past. To reveal their 
identity would endanger them and ruin their future usefulness, further this source came to us and 
asked for nothing in return for providing us with the information. CS#2 is personally known by 
Det. Randall. This person also came to Det. Randall as a concerned citizen although, this person 
has never provided information in the past, they are not involved in the drug culture and have no 
reason to provide us with false information. Neither source is being compensated in any way for 
their information or assistance in this case . 
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THE STATE OF UTAH TO ANY PEACE OFFICER. 
Probable cause appearing from the Affidavit in Support of Search Warrant filed herein; 
YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED to make an immediate search of the following: I 
have probable cause to believe these items are on the premises described as: 462 South 100 
West in St. George, Utah. This is a single family brick dwelling. The front door of the residence 
faces East, there is also a second door visible from the street and it faces South. There is a 
driveway on both the North and South sides of the residence. The numbers "462" are painted on 
the curb in front of the residence, the same numbers are also on a mail box which is in front of the 
residence to the left of the door that faces East. 
The search shall also include all related storage areas, outbuildings, locked and unlocked 
containers, curtilage, vehicles associated with the occupants of the residence, as well as those 
persons present during the execution of the search warrant. Also the "abandoned" vehicles that 
are in the back yard of the residence. 
Also the persons of Johnny Winston Bangerter (D.O.B. 06-23-69), he is a white male, 
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about 6'0r tall and weighing around 200 pounds. The person of Grant Justin Bangerter (D.OJB. 
04-26-73) he is about 5'07N tall and weighs around 195 pounds he is also a white male. 
YOU ARE FURTHER COMMANDED to search for: Methamphetamine, a controlled 
substance, and it's related paraphernalia, laboratory equipment, and any precursors used for the 
manufacture of a controlled substance. Also any records indicating possession or purchase of 
controlled substances, laboratory equipment, products, components, precursors, or instructions 
commonly associated with the manufacture or distribution of a controlled substance, as well as 
items listed on attachment "C-2". 
YOU ARE FURTHER COMMANDED to hold any property seized subject to further 
order of this Court. This Warrant should be executed as soon as practicable, and is void after 10 
days if not served. A verified RETURN and INVENTORY of property seized must be made 
promptly to the Court. 
This Warrant must be executed during daylight hours, after giving notice 
of authority and purpose, unless special authority is granted below. 
yg>*o\x are authorized to search DAY or NIGHT. 
are authorized to search WITHOUT NOTICE. 
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